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THE DEATH OF SECTION 504t
Ruth Colker*
I. INTRODUCTION
The passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act' (ADA) was a
significant and positive development for the law of disability dis-
crimination. The ADA strengthened the rights that already existed
under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 19732 by extending
those rights to the private sector.3 Because Section 504 and the In-
dividuals with Disabilities Education Act 4 (IDEA) already provided
protection for students with disabilities,' the ADA's primary impact
has been on the law of employment and accessibility.6
t © 2002 Ruth Colker
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1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994).
3. See, e.g., Ronald D. Wenkart, The Americans with Disabilities Act and Its Impact on Pub-
lic Education, 82 EDuc. LAw. REP. 291, 291 (1993) ("It is expected that the Act will have its
greatest impact in the private sector, since the provisions of the ADA are patterned after the
provisions of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which prohibits discrimination
against the handicapped by agencies receiving federal financial assistance.").
4. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (formerly known as the Educa-
tion of All Handicapped Children Act).
5. The IDEA requires states, which accept federal finding for their educational pro-
grams (as virtually all do), to ensure that all children with disabilities receive a "free
appropriate public education" in the least restrictive environment possible. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1412. The IDEA targets all children with disabilities who require special education ser-
vices, and are therefore classified as educationally disabled. 20 U.S.C. § 1400. A child may
have a disability within the meaning of Section 504 yet not be covered by the IDEA because
the child is not in need of special education services. For example, a child who uses a wheel-
chair may have no difficulties in learning associated with her disability but cannot gain
access to the building without improvements in accessibility. The accessibility requirements
would be governed by Section 504 rather than the ADA.
6. In a previously constructed data base, the author found that seventy-six percent of
all ADA appellate cases were based upon claims of employment discrimination. See Ruth
Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 99, 100 n.7 (1999) [hereinafter Colker, Windfall]. Although the author has not been
able to document much litigation under ADA Title III (which involves accessibility matters),
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In theory, the ADA should have had little impact on institutions
already covered by Section 504 other than to increase publicity
about the existence of the rights of individuals with disabilities.
Section 504 was the model for drafting the ADA;7 the similarities
are particularly striking with regard to coverage of the public sec-
tor.8 The Section 504 regulations often became the text of the
ADA, itself. Codifying these pre-existing rights might have had the
effect of improving voluntary compliance with these rights. The
nature of the rights, themselves, however, should have been largely
unchanged. In fact, Congress expressly dictated that the pre-
existing rights under Section 504 should be the "floor" in deter-
mining the meaning of the ADA. 9
This Article argues that the passage of the ADA had an unex-
pected consequence, namely the narrowing of the rights that were
understood to exist under Section 504.'° Section 504 covered two
broad areas of the law: the law of employment for individuals em-
ployed by entities receiving federal financial assistance and the law
of education for students attending primary, secondary or higher
education. The effect on the law of employment, which I will dis-
cuss in Part II, has been immediate and dramatic. The effect on
the law of education, discussed in Part III, cannot yet be fully
documented. Recent decisions, however, suggest that those rights
it is clear that many private and public institutions have been modified to increase their
accessibility. For a discussion of ADA Title III, see generally Ruth Colker, ADA Title III: A
Fragile Compromise, 21 BERKELEYJ. EMs. & LAB. L. 377 (2000).
7. See Colker, Windfall, supra note 6, at 134-35.
8. Whereas the ADA states, "[s]ubject to the provisions of this subchapter, no quali-
fied individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public
entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity," 42 U.S.C. § 12132, the Rehabili-
tation Act states, "[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability ... shall, solely by
reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal finan-
cial assistance ... ." 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994). The only important difference in language is
that Section 504 has the "solely" requirement which is absent from the ADA. Omission of
the word "solely" should make the ADA broader than Section 504 with respect to determi-
nations that discrimination has taken place.
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201 (a) ("Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, nothing in
this chapter shall be construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under
title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 790 et seq.) or the regulations issued by
Federal agencies pursuant to such title.").
10. This Article will not discuss the effect that the Eleventh Amendment decisions may
have on the ADA and Section 504. One could argue, however, that passage of the ADA
heightened people's sensitivities to the regulation of state and local government causing
courts for the first time to question the constitutionality of Section 504 under the spending
power. See, e.g.,Jim C. v. Ark. Dep't of Educ., 197 F.3d 958 (8th Cir. 1999) (granting rehear-
ing en banc on spending clause issue in Section 504 case); Amos v. Md. Dep't of Pub. Safety
& Corr. Servs., 178 F.3d 212 (4th Cir. 1999), reh 'g en banc granted, judgment vacated (Dec. 28,
1999).
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may also soon be limited. Thus, this Article argues that passage of
the ADA resulted in the demise, if not the death, of Section 504.
Section 504 litigation could take on even further importance if
the United States Supreme Court were to conclude that principles
of sovereign immunity precluded private damages actions under
ADA Title II." It would indeed be ironic if the passage of the ADA
resulted in the dilution of the pre-existing rights under Section
504 while the ADA is also found not to provide a private damages
remedy for individuals against state government.
II. THE LAW OF EMPLOYMENT
In two previous articles, I reported appellate outcome statistics
for ADA employment discrimination cases. 2 Table I reports ADA
data fromJanuary 1994 throughJuly 30, 1999:13
11. In Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001), the
Supreme Court held that Congress did not properly abrogate the states' sovereign immu-
nity under ADA Title I for employment discrimination cases brought against the state, but
did not resolve whether that principle applied generally to ADA Title II for nonemploy-
ment cases involving discrimination in the provision of programs and services at the state
level. The Supreme Court will ultimately resolve that issue; at this time, it has not granted
certiorari in a case addressing that issue. A further complication, however, is that Section
504 may become a less viable source of a private right of action. See, e.g., Alexander v.
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 284 (2001) (implying that private fight of action does not exist to
enforce Section 504 regulations that go beyond the "authoritative interpretation of the
statute"); see also Garrett v. Univ. of Ala., 261 F.3d 1242 (lth Cir. 2001), reh'ggranted, 276
E3d 1227 (1lth Cir. 2001) (holding that suit in federal court by state employees to recover
money damages by reason of the state's failure to comply with the ADA or Section 504 are
barred by the Eleventh Amendment).
12. See Colker, Windfall, supra note 6; Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing Under the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act, 62 OHIo ST. L.J. 239 (2001) [hereinafter Colker, Winning and
Losing]. This data reflects appellate cases decided during the applicable time period which
are available on Westlaw. It does not reflect trial court decisions and does not reflect appel-
late court decisions which are not made available to the public. This data reflects selection
bias problems which were discussed in other articles. See, e.g., Colker, Winning and Losing,
supra, at 244-47.
13. The ADA became effective two years after passage; the first appellate cases were
decided in 1994. The database only reflects decisions through July 30, 1999.
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TABLE 1: ADA EMPLOYMENT CASES
[VOL. 35:1&2
MEAN:
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999"
*Through 7/31
YEAR # OF PRO-DEFENDANT APPELLATE CASES/ PERCENTAGE
TOTAL # OF APPELLATE CASES
1994 5 out of 6 83.3
1995 35 out of 42 83.3
1996 96 out of 114 84.2
1997 158 out of 178 88.7
1998 189 out of 219 86.3
1999 140 out of 161 86.9
Mean 623 out of 720 86.5
Table 1 reflects a strong pro-defendant trend in appellate out-
comes in employment cases that are available on Westlaw. Since
the appellate courts began to hear employment discrimination
cases under the ADA, defendants have had successful outcomes in
86.5% of the cases.' 4 This figure, however, does not mean that de-
14. A successful outcome for a defendant is defined as the affirmance of a pro-
defendant outcome at trial or the reversal of a pro-plaintiff outcome at trial. The affirmance
of a pro-defendant outcome at trial results in a clear victory for the defendant unless the
case is appealed to the Supreme Court. It is, of course, possible that a reversal of a pro-
plaintiff trial court outcome on appeal will ultimately result in the plaintiff winning (again)
on remand. Nonetheless, the overwhelming majority of pro-defendant appellate outcomes
involve affirmances of pro-defendant trial court outcomes. For example, of the 623 cases
defined as a pro-defendant appellate outcome, 594, or 95.3%, were affirmances of pro-
defendant trial court outcomes (data available from author). If anything, this definition of
pro-defendant outcome understates defendant's success rate because the definition of pro-
plaintiff outcome included affirmances of pro-plaintiff trial court outcomes as well as rever-
sals of pro-defendant trial court outcomes. Of the ninety-seven pro-plaintiff appellate
outcomes, only sixteen, or sixteen percent, of those cases were affirmances of pro-plaintiff
FALL 2001-WINTER 2002]
fendants are winning 86.5% of all ADA employment discrimina-
tion cases. It merely means that defendants have prevailed in
86.5% of ADA appellate, employment discrimination cases that are
available on Westlaw for the time period under investigation. Be-
cause these statistics are overwhelmingly pro-defendant, they
suggest that plaintiffs' lawyers are over-predicting their chance of
success on appeal. They are acting seemingly irrationally in ex-
pending financial resources to appeal cases which, in hindsight,
faced little chance of success.
Why would plaintiff lawyers make such large miscalculations in
deciding which cases to appeal? 15 One way to understand this prob-
lem is to say that plaintiff lawyers have acted irrationally-that they
have made decisions to appeal cases out of a false sense of poten-
tial success. Because most lawyers take ADA cases on a contingency
fee basis, it makes little sense for a lawyer to pursue meritless litiga-
tion on appeal. One would expect that economic forces would
cause plaintiffs' lawyers to make conservative judgments on appeal,
so that the plaintiff success rate would come close to the fifty per-
cent figure which is postulated by the proponents of the 'judicial
expectations" model for litigation outcomes.' 6
One factor causing plaintiff lawyers to overpredict their chance
of success on appeal may be their relatively successful experience
under another, similar statute.17 Their success rate on appeal in
employment discrimination cases18 brought under Section 50419
was approximately thirty-five percent on the eve of the effective
date of ADA Title I. Yet, when plaintiffs' lawyers applied their ex-
perience from Section 504 to ADA litigation, they experienced a
much lower success rate. In other words, the judicial response to
their ADA cases was worse than they would have expected given
their Section 504 experience. Thus, higher success rates under
Section 504 may have caused plaintiffs' lawyers to overpredict their
trial court outcomes. The remaining cases were reversals of pro-defendant trial court out-
comes. It is quite possible that the plaintiff will ultimately lose on remand in the 81 cases in
which the appellate court reversed a dismissal or summary judgment decision at the trial
court level.
15. SeeColker, Windfall, supra note 6, at 109-10.
16. See generally George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litiga-
tion, 13J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984) (discussing litigation selection process).
17. See Colker, Winning and Losing, supra note 12, at 264.
18. Section 504 cases can be brought against any entity receiving federal financial assis-
tance. They are not limited to issues of employment discrimination. In fact, it appears that
most Section 504 cases brought before 1994 involved issues of educational discrimination.
19. The database also includes Section 501 and 503 employment discrimination cases
although the overwhelming majority of the cases are brought under Section 504.
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success rate in ADA litigation in the early years of the interpreta-
tion of that statute. °
This Article explores how the passage of the ADA may have
affected judicial outcomes under Section 504. As Table 2 illus-
trates, the ADA failure rate seeped into Section 504 litigation
beginning in 1994.
TABLE 2
§ 504 EMPLOYMENT CASES
100
" 90
-o 80-- - - -
-
--- 
-
70
o 60
2 50
(I) 30
20
Up thin '82-'83 '84-'85 '86-87 '88-89 '90-91 '92-93 '94-95 '9r-'97 '98-99
'81
..... ADA Employment: 86.5%
.....-- § 504 Employment: 79.5%
DATE PRO-DEFENDANT PERCENTAGE OF
OUTCOMES/ PRo-DEFENDANT OUTCOMES
ALL OUTCOMES
Before 1982 2 out of 4 50
1982-1983 4 out of 8 50
1984-1985 6 out of 7 85.7
1986-1987 8 out of 10 80
1988-1989 7 out of 12 58.3
1990-1991 18 out of 28 64.3
1992-1993 18 out of 28 64.3
1994-1995 35 out of 46 76.1
20. Many other explanations are also possible to explain this pattern over time. The
defense bar may have become increasingly sophisticated in handling disability discrimina-
tion claims (thereby mounting a stronger defense on appeal), the judiciary may have grown
increasingly conservative or hostile to ADA claims, plaintiffs may have been overly embold-
ened by the passage of the ADA and pursued frivolous claims, and pro se plaintiffs may not
be responding to the economic forces that affect private litigation. This Article's focus on
one explanation is not intended to discount these other explanations. Their cumulative
effect may explain the results that have been discovered.
[VOL. 35:1&2
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DATE PRO-DEFENDANT PERCENTAGE OF
OUTCOMES/ PRO-DEFENDANT OUTCOMES
ALL OUTCOMES
1996-1997 42 out of 44 95.5
1998-1999 77 out of 86 89.5
§ 504 Employment 217 out of 273 79.5
Mean (All)
ADA Employment 623 out of 720 86.5
Mean (All)
Although the overall figure is a seventy-nine percent pro-
defendant outcome, the statistics change significantly before and
after 1994 as illustrated in Table 3 below.
TABLE 3
§ 504 EMPLOYMENT CASES: 1994 SPLIT
90j ADA Employment Mean: 86.5%
-
85
70
65
60
Before 1994 1994 & After
CATEGORY OF CASE PRo-DEFENDANT PERCENTAGE OF
OUTCOME/ PRO-DEFENDANT
ALL OUTCOMES OUTCOMES
§ 504 Employment Before 1994 63 out of 97 64.94
§ 504 Employment 1994-1999 154 out of 176 87.5
ADA Employment 1994-7/31/1999 623 out of 720 86.5
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After 1994, the Section 504 employment decisions have virtually
had the same outcome as ADA employment decisions. The defen-
dant success rate under Section 504 rose twenty-three percent after
the appellate courts began deciding ADA employment discrimina-
tion cases. These results were statistically significant at the 0.001
level of statistical significance in a Pearson Chi-Square test.21 In
other words, a significant factor in predicting appellate outcome
under Section 504 is whether the appeal was decided before or
after 1994.
These statistics also reveal that the volume of Section 504 appel-
late litigation increased substantially when the ADA was enacted.
There are more Section 504 decisions decided by the appellate
courts and made available on Westlaw from 1994 to 1998 than
there were from 1988 to 1994.2  That increase is due, in part, to the
publicity about disability discrimination matters preceding and
following the passage of the ADA. Although the number of Section
504 cases increased beginning in 1990, the change in judicial out-
come did not occur until 1994, when the courts were also first
faced with ADA lawsuits.
There are four ways to explain the drop-off in the plaintiff suc-
cess rate following 1994. First, the defense bar may have become
more organized and thoughtful in its litigation strategy, now that it
had a larger volume of cases to defend under Section 504 and the
ADA. Second, while the appellate courts were initially relatively
sympathetic to Section 504 claims when they typically involved is-
sues of educational discrimination, they may have become less
sympathetic as the volume increased and the type of claim increas-
ingly involved employment matters. Third, new plaintiffs' lawyers
may have done a poor job in litigating these cases.23 Finally, the
circuit courts may have adjusted Section 504 case law to comport
with the pro-defendant interpretations of the statute by the Su-
preme Court.
4
21. The statistics were analyzed under SPSS version 9.0.
22. No Section 504 cases in the appellate courts were located on Westlaw prior to 1988
which involved issues of employment discrimination. Failure to locate such cases does not
mean that such cases do not exist; it may simply mean that such cases were not made avail-
able to 'Westlaw or that Westlaw did not choose to include such cases in their data base prior
to 1988.
23. SeeJeffrey A. Van Detta & Dan R. Gallipeau, Judges and Juries: Why Are So Many ADA
Plaintiffs Losing Summary Judgment Motions, and Why Would They Fare Better Before a Jury? A
Response to Professor Colker, 19 REv. LITIG. 505, 517 (2000) ("Many ADA cases founder be-
cause counsel for plaintiffs have not prepared the minimum factual record necessary to
provide the jury with a basis to conclude that the ADA protects their clients.")
24. Although there has been much publicity about the pro-defendant decisions ren-
dered by the Supreme Court under the ADA, comparatively little attention has been
VOL. 35:1&2
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Regardless of why this pattern emerged, an important transition
took place. While Section 504 cases may have stood a reasonable
chance of success on appeal for plaintiffs until 1994, those chances
of success on appeal diminished significantly after 1994. Passage of
the ADA may have had a causal effect on that change. The ADA
may have helped transform Section 504 from a relatively successful
statute for plaintiffs to a relatively unsuccessful statute. This effect
may have not been limited to employment discrimination claims; it
may have occurred for all Section 504 claims, including claims of
educational discrimination which have historically predominated
Section 504 claims. The passage of the ADA therefore may have
been the death knell to Section 504.
focused on the fact that the Supreme Court has also consistently interpreted Section 504 in
a pro-defendant manner. Of the seventeen Section 504 cases heard by the Supreme Court
between 1979 and 1996, only two of them resulted in a pro-plaintiff holding. See Sch. Bd. of
Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987) (holding that contagious diseases can be cov-
ered under Section 504 as a disability); Consol. Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (1984)
(holding that an action for employment discrimination against an individual with a disabil-
ity may be maintained even if the federal aid the defendant receives is not for employment
purposes). Although four of the seventeen cases cannot be readily classified as pro-plaintiff
or pro-defendant, eleven of the decisions rendered during this time period were clearly
pro-defendant. See Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187 (1996) (holding that Congress had not waived
the federal government's sovereign immunity under Section 504 with respect to awards of
monetary damages); Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535 (1988) (permitting the Veteran's
Administration to distinguish between veterans who are and are not alcoholics in rendering
treatment decisions); United States Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S.
597 (1986) (holding that commercial airlines are not the recipients of federal funding due
to airport operators or government control of the air traffic control system); Bowen v. Am.
Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610 (1986) (invalidating rules promulgated under Section 504 to
protect infants with disabilities); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985)
(finding that Congress failed to use the necessary unequivocal language necessary to abro-
gate the Eleventh Amendment so that plaintiff could not obtain requested relief);
Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985) (finding that Tennessee did not violate Section
504 in its treatment of Medicaid patients); Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Texas, 468 U.S. 883
(1984) (finding that Section 504 could not be used as a basis to attain attorney's fees in case
involving discrimination in violation of the Education of the Handicapped Act); Smith v.
Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984) (same holding as Tatro); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (finding no Section 504 violation in treatment of patients at
state hospital); Cmty. Television of S. Cal. v. Gottfried, 459 U.S. 498 (1982) (finding that
Section 504 does not impose new enforcement obligations on the FCC to consider disability
accessibility issues in license renewal applications); S.E. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397
(1979) (holding that nursing program could lawfully fail to admit plaintiff into its program
due to her hearing impairment). Many of these decisions did not directly relate to issues of
employment discrimination. Hence, they may not have had a major impact on lower courts
rendering employment discrimination decisions under Section 504. Moreover, one of the
pro-plaintiff cases, namely Arline, did have a significant impact on Section 504 employment
discrimination cases. Hence, it is possible that this record had only a minimal impact on the
lower courts until the appellate courts and the Supreme Court followed these decisions with
strong, pro-defendant decisions under the ADA.
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Ironically, this result is exactly the opposite of Congress' intent.
Congress stated clearly in the ADA that the prior Section 504 rules
of law were supposed to be the floor and not the ceiling for the
rules of law under the ADA.2 ' Instead, the ADA has pulled the rug
out from under Section 504.
III. EDUCATION CASES
While the ADA is primarily known for its impact on the law of
employment, Section 504 is best known for its impact on the law of
education, particularly the law of higher education. Although the
IDEA is the primary regulator of the law of primary education,
Section 504 is the primary regulator of higher education law. Part
II documented how the ADA has had a plausible effect on the law
of employment under Section 504. This section addresses the ef-
fect it has arguably had on the law of education.
Education discrimination claims at the appellate level have been
somewhat more successful than employment discrimination
claims. The ADA's effect on these cases is not as clear as its effect
on the employment cases. Nonetheless, the following data suggests
that the ADA may soon have an adverse effect on Section 504 edu-
cation cases.
The following two tables document the Section 504 education
cases.
25. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201 (a) ("Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, nothing in
this Chapter shall be construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under
Title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (20 U.S.C. 790 et seq.) or the regulations issued by
Federal agencies pursuant to such title.").
26. See supra Tables 1-3.
[VOL. 35:1&2
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TABLE 4
§ 504 EDUCATION CASES
90 
__ Mean
.. ........... ......................... 86.5
80 m l
o-- -------
ca 
-67.6
0
0a
a) 40 
-
W) 30 -
0
10 
-
0 
B~efore 19 1982- 194 198- 19 1990- 19- 1994- 1999- 1998-
19M) 1%95 1W9 199 1991 1999 1999 199 1999
. ADA Employment (86.5) - § 504 Employment (79.5) § 504 Education (67.6)
DATE PRO-DEFENDANT PERCENTAGE OF
OUTCOME/ PRO-DEFENDANT
ALL CASES OUTCOME
Before 1982 4 out of 8 50
1982-1983 5 out of 10 50
1984-1985 4 out of 5 80
1986-1987 2 out of 3 66.7
1988-1989 4 out of 5 80
1990-1991 5 out of 8 62.5
1992-1993 4 out of 5 80
1994-1995 5 out of 7 71.4
1996-1997 6 out of 8 75
1998-1999 11 out of 15 73.3
§ 504 Education Mean (All) 50 out of 74 67.6
§ 504 Employment Mean (All) 217 out of 273 79.5
ADA Employment Mean (All) 623 out of 720 86.5
Defendants' success rate in Section 504 education cases was
somewhat lower than it was under Section 504 employment cases
(sixty-eight percent in education area as compared with eighty
percent in employment area). However, the figures after 1994
show a higher defendant success rate than the figures for the pe-
riod before 1994. Table 5 reflects those statistics.
The Death of Section 504
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TABLE 5
§ 504 EDUCATION CASES: 1994 SPLIT
Before 1994
[VOL. 35:1&2
1994 & After
DATE PRO-DEFENDANT PERCENTAGE OF
OUTCOME/ PRO-DEFENDANT
ALL OUTCOMES OUTCOMES
Before 1994 28 out of 44 63.63
1994-1999 22 out of 30 73.33
Unlike the employment cases, this difference based on time is
not statistically significant. Nonetheless, a statistically significant
difference might appear in the future if the existing trend contin-
ues over the next several years.
The final table compares all the statistics.
FALL 2001-WINTER 2002]
TABLE 6
COMPARISON OF ADA AND § 504 CASES
iADA Emplyment
80
70
6- 64.9 63.6
0
40
30
20
10
n/a 9
Meore 191A
DATE PRO-DEFENDANT PERCENTAGE OF
OUTCOME/ PRO-DEFENDANT
ALL CASES OUTCOME
Before 1994 ADA n/a n/a
Before 1994 § 504 Employ. 63 out of 97 64.9
Before 1994 § 504 Educ. 28 out of 44 63.6
1994-7/31/1999 ADA Employ. 623 out of 720 86.5
1994-1999 § 504 Employ. 154 out of 176 87.5
1994-1999 § 504 Educ. 22 out of 30 73.3
Table 6 reflects that ADA and Section 504 employment cases are
currently obtaining the same rate of pro-defendant appellate out-
comes. This result is not surprising because most section 504 cases
are filed under both ADA and Section 504. Hence, whether a de-
fendant was public or private was not a significant factor in
predicting ADA appellate outcomes. Education cases have be-
come less successful since the passage of the ADA, but those cases
are still more successful than employment cases.
27. See Colker, Winning and Losing, supra note 12, at 270 (reporting that defendant's
status as a public or private defendant was not a significant factor in a regression analysis of
appellate judicial outcomes under the ADA).
0§ 504 Employment 03 § 504 Education
87.5
73.3 -
1994 & Alter
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Although Section 504 cases involving education issues are not
significantly more pro-defendant since the passage of the ADA,
such a trend may be on the horizon, because a significant number
of those cases involved individuals with a particularly contentious
disability, namely a learning disability.28 Of the seventy-eight cases
in the database, thirteen involved individuals with learning dis-
29
abilities. Of those thirteen cases, eight were decided before the
ADA became effective. Of those eight cases, three were successful.
In none of these thirteen cases did the court question whether the
plaintiff was disabled. Of the remaining five cases, which were de-
cided after the ADA became effective, one was successful. These
are obviously small numbers but an examination of the case law
suggests that cases involving learning disabilities have a much
more limited chance of success today than they did in 1992.
In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,° the Supreme Court concluded
that a court must consider corrective devices and mitigating meas-
ures when determining whether an individual is disabled under
the ADA. In light of that holding, it vacated and remanded a Sec-
ond Circuit case in which the court had concluded that an
individual with a learning disability was disabled for the purposes
of the ADA.3' Although the lower court in the Second Circuit de-
termined on remand that plaintiff is disabled and entitled to relief,
other courts have denied relief to such plaintiffs.
32
If individuals with learning disabilities are found not to be enti-
tled to relief under the ADA, then a student with a learning
disability who has attained accommodations under the IDEA
(which does not contain this set of requirements) may stop receiv-
ing accommodations upon admission to college and graduate
28. The media has often ridiculed cases involving students with learning disabilities.
See, e.g., Ruth Shalit, Defining Disability Down, New Republic, Aug. 25, 1997, at 16.
29. See Weber v. Cranston Sch. Comm., 212 F.3d 41 (1st Cir. 2000) (pro-defendant);
Wong v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 192 F.3d 807 (9th Cir. 1999) (pro-plaintiff); Smith v.
Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 184 F.3d 764 (8th Cir. 1999) (pro-defendant); Ridgewood Bd. of
Educ. v. N.E., 172 F.3d 238 (3rd Cir. 1999) (pro-plaintiff); Zukle v. Regents of the Univ. of
Cal., 166 F3d 1041 (9th Cir. 1999) (pro-defendant); Sellers v. Sch. Bd. of Manassas, 141 F.3d
524 (4th Cir. 1998) (pro-defendant); Susan N. v. Wilson Sch. Dist., 70 E3d 751 (3rd Cir.
1995) (pro-plaintiff); Mallett v. Marquette Univ., 65 F.3d 170 (7th Cir. 1995) (pro-
defendant); Sandison v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir. 1995) (pro-
defendant); Pottgen v. Mo. State High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 40 E3d 926 (8th Cir. 1994) (pro-
defendant); Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med., 976 F2d 791 (1st Cir. 1992) (pro-defendant);
Powell v. Defore, 699 F.2d 1078 (11th Cir. 1983) (pro-defendant); Miener v. Missouri, 673
F.2d 969 (8th Cir. 1982) (pro-plaintiff).
30. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
31. See N.Y. State Bd. of Law Exam'rs v. Bartlett, 527 U.S. 1031 (1999).
32. Compare Bartlett v. N.Y. State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, No. 93CIV.4986(SS), 2001 WL
930792 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2001) (granting relief) with Biank v. Nat'l Bd. of Med. Exam'rs,
130 F. Supp. 2d 986 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (denying relief).
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school if his or her IDEA-sponsored education was reasonably suc-
cessful. The successful intervention under the IDEA will disqualify
the student under the ADA because corrective measures have
helped alleviate some of the consequences of the underlying dis-
ability. The student, however, still has the underlying disability and
needs continued assistance to succeed academically.
When the ADA was enacted, commentators predicted that it
would be of particular benefit to students with learning disabilities
who were pursuing higher education. One commentator argued:
Students may have more opportunity for successful academic
accommodation claims as a result of recent cases and laws.
However, perhaps the most important aspect of the Rehabili-
tation Act and the ADA related to academic accommodations
is that both laws provide students with important tools-tools
that will be useful to them in dialogue with their respective
colleges and universities .... [S]tudents with disabilities
should enter colleges and universities knowing that the law
provides protection against discrimination. The law may not
allow students to receive every accommodation they believe
that they deserve, but it provides them with a place to begin
the dialogue.3
In fact, passage of the ADA may hinder discussion about ac-
commodations, because the discussion will now focus on the
whether the individual is even disabled.
CONCLUSION
One must wonder how the following conversation may have
taken place on the eve of passage of the ADA:
Member of Congress: I am willing to vote for the passage of
the ADA but I must warn you that passage of the ADA will
33. Claire E. McCusker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Its Potential for Expanding the
Scope of Reasonable Academic Accommodations, 21 J.C. & U.L. 619, 641 (1995).
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significantly harm litigation outcomes under Section 504. The
chances of a plaintiff prevailing on appeal will plummet by a
factor of two.
Member of Disability Rights Community #1: No thank you.
I'm not interested in a statute that will raise false hopes while
eroding the rights we have worked so hard to obtain.
Member of Disability Rights Community #2: I refuse to pro-
ceed from such a pessimistic outlook. Maybe we will see such
consequences in the early years following passage of the ADA.
But with educational efforts on the importance of these
rights, we can overcome those problems over time. In the
long run, we will have a strong Section 504 and ADA.
Member of Congress: So what should I do? Should I wait for a
better political and judicial climate or seize the opportunity at
hand despite the short term consequences? Can we be certain
those short term consequences will ever be reversed or, in-
stead, will ADA's lasting legacy be the death, not just the
wounding, of Section 504?
The positive news for the disability civil rights community is that
the ADA has not yet killed the law of education under Section 504
although it has had an arguably negative impact on the law of em-
ployment under Section 504. There is reason to believe, however,
that the narrowing of the law of higher education for students with
learning disabilities may be around the corner. There may soon be
a generation of students educated with the assistance of the IDEA
who are left to sink or swim in post-secondary education.
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